The Popular 2007-08 Budget by Ching, S
Title The Popular 2007-08 Budget
Author(s) Ching, S
Citation Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation, 2007, v. 11 n. 1, p. 21-25
Issued Date 2007
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/85689
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
T_ E C H N I C A L
C 0 L U M N’ S. I
The
Popular
2007-08
Budget
I Stephen Ching
Associate Professor
School of Economics and Finance
The University of Hong Kong
Introduction
The 2007—08 Budget (henceforth “the Budget’)
is the last budget of the current term of the
HKSAR Government (henceforth “the
Government”). While the current term of the
Government will end on 30 June 2007, the
Budget’s fiscal year will continue to 31 March
next year; that is, three quarters of the span of
the Budget will fall in the next term. This feature
is not specific to the current-term Government. It
is a general structure. The Government of any
term is allowed to formulate a budget that covers
the first nine months in office of the next-term
Government. The current-term Government has
the noble intention of leaving room for the next-
term Government and refrains from making
commitments for the next term. The unfortunate
consequence is that the Budget is bound to he
short-term.
The highlight of the Budget is a generous HK$20.
3 hillon package of tax relief and one-off tax rebate
measures. The package has three one-off
measures and over 70 per cent of the $20.3 billion
is allocated to them as follows:
• $8.1 billion for rebating 50 per cent salaries
tax (up to $15,000 a taxpayer)
• $5.2 billion for waiving two quarters of rates
(up to $5,000 a quarter)
• $1.5 billion forgiving one additional month
of CSSA and SSA payments
On the other hand, the offer is modest relative to
the higher-than-expected fiscal surplus. The
Budget revises the surplus to $55.1 billion, which
is almost 10 times the surplus estimated a year
ago in the last budget. The fiscal reserves are
revised to $365.8 billion, which corresponds to
18 months of government expenditure. up from
15 months of government expenditure estimated
initially.2
Not surprisingly, the Budget has been well received
by the society. For instance. 62.4 per cent of
respondents were satisfied with the Budget,
according to an instant survey conducted on
28 February 2007 by the HKU POP SITE.3 In a
follow-up survey conducted between 19 and
21 March. the satisfaction rate for the Budget
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remained high. at 62.1 per cent. Additionally, the
popularity of Financial Secretary Henry Tang jumped
on the announcement date of the Budget and
remained high. His support ratings were 60.8. 64.1,
and 65.6. respectively, between I and 6 February. on
28 February. and between I and 6 March.
Popularity, however, is not used here to evaluate
the Budget. because a popular budget often
sacrifices the long-term interests of the society.
The Budget is examined in light of this
proposition. This assessment shows that the
Budget is not only myopic but also unfair.
Alternative uses of the $20.3 billion are
suggested to address these two problems. Our
proposal also touches on two structural problems
in Hong Kong: population aging and the narrow
tax base. The evaluation is extended to other
budgetary issues.
Tax Relief and One-Off Tax
Rebate
In addition to the three one-off measures
mentioned in the introduction, the $20.3 billion
package has other (recurring) tax-relief measures.
For example. three concessions for salaries tax
are proposed. First, the marginal rates and
marginal hands for salaries tax will he reverted to
the 2002—03 levels. Second, child allowance will
be increased from $40,000 to $50,000 for each
child, and an additional one-off child allowance
of $50,000 will he introduced for each child in the
year of birth. Third, the maximum amount of
deduction for self-education expenses will be
increased from $40,000 to $60,000. These three
concessions are estimated to cost the Government
$4.9 billion a year.
There are two other recurring measures in the
package, which are to (1) lower the stamp duty on
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property transactions with values between $1 million
and $2 million from 0.75 per cent to a fixed amount
of $100. and (2) halve the duty rate on beer, wine,
and other types of liquor containing not more than
30 per cent of alcohol. These two measures will
lower government revenue by $250 million and
$350 million, respectively, a year.
Note that the total cost of these recurring
measures is $5.5 billion, which is only one-tenth
of the fiscal surplus and about one-third of the
total cost of the three one-off measures. We
support emphasising the usc of one-off measures
for tax relief.4 The tax base in Hong Kong is
narrow and relies heavily on profits tax and [I
salaries tax. As a result, tax revenues in Hong
Kong fluctuate widely with business cycles.
Using one-off measures has the advantage of
avoiding the unnecessary difficulties of raising
taxes back during economic downturns. However,
there are alternative one-off measures better than
the ones proposed in the Budget.
The problem with the current one-off measures
is that they are purely short-term. One might
wonder whether this is a valid criticism. Isn’t it
true that all one-off measures are short-term? We
argue that this is not necessarily the case.
Specifically, we suggest that the Government
make a one-off contribution of. say. $13.3 billion
(the sum of the one-off tax and rates rebates) to
individual MPF/ORSO accounts. The amount
each individual receives can be a percentage of
the employer contribution in 2006-07, subject to
a minimum as well as a maximum amount. This
proposal corrects the short-sightedness of the
Government. It allows the Government to provide
leadership to address the anticipated population
aging problem in Hong Kong and highlight the
need of relying on private savings accounts to
deal with the problem. The same idea can he used
22 Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation
Vol. 11 No. I — Spring/Summer 2CC
I 1 E C H N IC AL
to address a related problem: medical financing.
The Government can use a one-oH contribution
as a sweetener for the introduction of private
medical savings accounts.
Another advantage of our proposal is that it
benefits the entire working population. A criticism
of the package in the Budget is that it is unfair to
the lower working class who (1) don’t pay salaries
tax. (2> don’t own their homes, and (3) don’t rely
on CSSA. They are completely neglected by the
Budget. We agree that it is absurd for the
Government to allow the CSSA recipients to
enjoy, hut not the lower working class to share,
the fruits of economic prosperity, to which the
latter group have contributed.
One feature of our proposal is that an individual
will receive a positive net transfer from the
Government if the individual does not pay salaries
tax or pays a salaries tax less than the government
contribution to the individual’s MPF/ORSO
account. This feature can he used as a package
to lower the basic allowance. It can ease the
resistance from new taxpayers if it is structured
in such a way that the salaries taxes paid by new
taxpayers are less than the government
contribution to their MPF/ORSO accounts. The
advantage is that the Government can widen the
tax base in the long run.
One Additional Month of CSSA
The Budget has an atypical one-off measure of
giving one additional month of CSSA and SSA
payments. The total cost of the additional CSSA
and SSA payments is about $1.5 billion, hut a
breakdown is not provided by the Budget. We
use the figures in the latest annual report of the
Social Welfare Department to estimate the
breakdown.6 The ratio of the annual total
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expenditure of the CSSA Scheme to the SSA
Scheme increased continuously Irom 2.64 in
2t)(.)0-.0 Ito 3.36 in 2(X)4—05. The average ratio over
this five-year period was 3.02 and is used to
estimate the cost of the additional month of CSSA
payments. The cost is estimated to he more than
$1.1 billion. This is a conservative estimate,
because the total expenditure of the CSSA
Scheme is rising relative to the SSA Scheme.
Since $1.1 billion is not a small number, it is
important to figure out what the Government can
achieve with it.
Do the additional payments mean that the current
level of CSSA payments is not sufficient to meet
the basic and special needs of CSSA recipients’?
If yes, how can the problem he solved by giving
only one more month of payments to them? If no,
why does the Government reward CSSA
recipients for economic prosperity that they do
not seem to have contributed to? Of course, the
Government has the authority to insist on sharing
the fruits of economic prosperity with CSSA
recipients. Our point is that CSSA recipients
deserve more than one additional month of
payments. They deserve an opportunity to regain
their dignity by moving from welfare to self-reliance.
We just do not see how giving them one more month
of payments can help them achieve this.
To be fair, the Budget does have two more
positive measures for helping CSSA recipients
become more self-reliant: (I) introducing a one-
year pilot Transport Support Scheme, and (2)
relaxing disregarded earnings. The costs of (I)
and (2) are $300 million and $30 million,
respectively. In other words, the total cost of
these two measures is only 30 per cent of the
additional month of CSSA payments. One cannot
help hut ask why the Government allocates
substantially more to a purely myopic measure
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than to these two more positive measures, it only
shows that the Government really does not know
how to help CSSA reciptents. The provision of
the additional month of CSSA payments is the
most disappointing part of the Budget. The
Government gives away money that could have
been used to create opportunities for CSSA
recipients to become self-reliant.
Film Development Fund
Another unusual measure of the Budget is the
earmarking of $300 million for setting up a film
development fund, Recall that the cost of the pilot
Transport Support Scheme is also $300 million. It
seems that $300 million is a magic number in the
Budget. Indeed, exactly the same amount is
earmarked for setting up a child development
fund. Why does the film industry deserve the
same financial support as CSSA recipients who
struggle to he self-reliant or children from a
disadvantaged background who need more
development opportunities? No rationale has
been provided by the Government for allocating
the same amount to these three different
initiatives. It is important for the Government to
understand that resources allocation cannot be
arbitrary.
More importantly, why does the Government
subsidize the film industry hut not other
(creative) industries? The policy of “positive
nonintervention” was renounced by the Chief
Executive Donald Tsang in a statement at the
Economic Submit on ‘China 11th Five-Year Plan”
on Il September 2006. Does this mean that the
Government can pick a winner now? Is it a
manifestation of the new regime of”market leads.
government facilitates”? Now the Government can
‘facilitate” the development of a special interest
group in the market if the group has “led” a
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successlul lobby. We hope that this is not what
the new regime stands for. The point is that the
Government needs to articulate its policy clearly
and implement it accordingly.
Fiscal Reserves
The discussion in the Budget reveals that the
fiscal policy is arbitrary in setting the target level
of fiscal reserves. In 2003, the target level was
lowered to 12 months of government expenditure,
in view of the then serious fiscal deficit problem.
Now the fiscal reserves have already reached a
level equivalent to 18 months of government
expenditure and are projected to further increase
to 24 months of government expenditure by
2011—12. One would expect the Government to
adjust the fiscal reserves to the target level, if the
target level is taken seriously.
However, the discussion initiated by the
Government indicates that the opposite is true.
The Government suggests using the IMF
recommendation as a frame of reference for setting
the target level of fiscal reserves, which is
between 30 and 50 per cent of GDP. Note that the
IMF recommendation sets the target level in
terms of a percentage of GDP, which is different
from the old basis (as a certain number of months
of government expenditure). No explanation is
offered by the Budget to justify the change. If
one wants to compare the new basis with the old
basis, it is handy to use the 2011—12 fiscal
reserves, which are projected by the Budget to
be 30.1 per cent of GDP and, at the same time, 24
months of government expenditure. Hence, the
Government essentially proposes to at least
double the target level to 24 months of
government expenditure. Can the target level be
meaningful if it can he adjusted arbitrarily
downward (upward) when the Government
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experiences fiscal deficits (surpluses)? If the
Government wants to initiate a meaningful
discussion on (he optimal target level of fiscal
reserves, it has to take the target level seriously
The persistently low investment returns of the
fiscal reserves are also an issue. In response to
calls for higher returns from the fiscal reserves,
the Government proposes a new income-sharing
arrangement between the fiscal reserves and the
Exchange Fund as follows: The return of the
fiscal reserves is now computed as the average
return of the Exchange Fund’s investment
portfolio over the past six years. subject to a
minimum return of not less than the average yield
of three-year Exchange Fund Notes for the
previous year. Note that the change proposed by
the Government is purely in accounting. It is naive
for the Government to use the new income-
sharing arrangement to increase the return of
fiscal reserves. The effect of the new arrangement
is to shift most of the fluctuations in investment
returns to the balance of fiscal reserves at the
Exchange Fund. The Government should
understand that the return of fiscal reserves
cannot be increased by any accounting changes
to the income-sharing arrangement, as long as
the Government keeps depositing the fiscal
reserves in the Exchange Fund and the Exchange
Fund fails to improve its investment perlbrmance.
Conclusion
This assessment of the Budget is consistent with
the proposition that a popular budget often
sacrifices the long-term interests of the society.
This assessment also reveals that the Government
fails to manage public finance prudently when
the fiscal surplus is abundant. Money is not spent
in a way that addresses the two structural
problems (population aging and the narrow tax
base) in Hong Kong. More seriously, the
Government gives away some money that does
not seem to he able to achieve anything. Last hut
not least, there is evidence indicating that the
fiscal policy is becoming arbitrary.
Endnotes
1. 1 am grateful to an anonymous referee for
helpful comments.
2. The 2006—07 fiscal surplus is further revised
up to $58.6 billion by the Financial Services
and the Treasury Bureau on April 30, 2007.
3. All the rating scores referred here arc based
on the surveys conducted by the HKU POP
SITE (http://hkupop.hku.hk).
4. See also Stephen Ching, “Has the Budget
Addressed the Deficit Problem?” Asia-Pacflc
Journal of Taxation 5(1). Spring 2001, 71—75.
5. Employees are not required to make
contributions if their monthly income is less
than $5,000.
6. Social Welfare Department Annual Report
2003 & 2004 (http://www.swd.gov.hkldoc/
annreporil0304annrepe.pdfi
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